Posted by revoltingeurope ⋅ july 23, 2017
For the greek economist, the single currency has simply allowed berlin
to dominate the european market and to become a global exporter country: “the
euro was a disaster”. And on greece he adds: “syriza shows us what we should
not do and how we should not organize ourselves. Those who want to change
things from the left must begin to fight the european institutions and create
new ones.”
Interview
with costas lapavitsas of steven forti
“the euro has only facilitated a german-centric europe”. Costas
lapavitsas (1961), a professor of economics at the university of london’s
school of oriental and african studies, is a partisan of greece’s exit from the
euro. He is the author of several books, including crisis in the eurozone
(verso, 2012) and, with heiner flassbeck, against the troika. Crisis and
austerity in the eurozone (verso, 2015). A long-time activist of the hellenic
left, he joined syriza in 2012 and was elected mp in the first government of alexis
tsipras in january 2015. He abandoned the greek parliament and the party after
the signing of the third memorandum in the summer two years ago. Since then,
he’s been extremely critical of the experience of syriza’s governments and
diem25, the european project of former finance minister yannis varoufakis.
It seems
that the crisis has come to an end. Is this really the case?
Things have calmed down, i would say. But more than a crisis, what seems
to me to be more correct to speak of now is the new europe that is emerging.
And this is not a very pleasant europe.
What
would this “new” europe be?
Germany has successfully tackled the eurozone crisis. In europe, a
centre has been formed, represented by germany, and more specifically by the
german industrial complex. Especially the automotive and chemical industry,
which is very focused on exports. Around this centre are forming a series of
suburbs (peripheries). At the beginning of the crisis in the eurozone, we were
talking about a single periphery. And it was correct. Now we know that there
are more. And in this, italy is important because it is halfway between this
new centre and the periphery. Italy is still suffering from the crisis, but it
is also the only country in europe that has an industrial complex that can
compete with germany. Much more than france which has destroyed its industries
and has suffered a profound process of financialization of the economy over
recent decades.
You
talked about different peripheries. What are they? And in what way do they
differentiate themselves?
We can clearly recognize two types of peripheries. One is that of the
satellites of germany. These are countries that can be part of the euro or not,
such as poland, the czech republic, slovakia, slovenia and part of austria. Countries
that are directly linked to the german industrial process. This is the european
manufacturing centre. Which is starting to attract other countries: romania,
hungary … the economy of these countries is increasingly dependent on how the
german automotive industry works. The other peripheries are the southern one:
greece, spain, portugal, a part of italy. They are countries with a strong
public sector, high levels of unemployment, are economically uncompetitive and
have no industrial structure that can compete internationally. And,
importantly, they are members of the euro. Which is why they are not
competitive. Their role is to provide labour to german industry.
What is
the role of france in this “new” europe?
France is a country in the centre [of europe], but it has no industrial
strength to compete with germany. He lost the game with the germans inside the
euro. Medium or long term it will be subordinate to germany.
Can
macron’s arrival at the elysee change this situation?
France remains a powerful country, but what can macron do to compete
economically with germany? It can also make better relations with merkel than
hollande or reinforce the french military presence in the world, but it will
not change anything. Moreover, its economic program contains exactly what the
germans want: lower wages, labour reform, privatizations … the only hope for
france in this context is to strengthen its financial system. There it has
important advantages.
According
to some economists, the euro was a “protective shield” during the crisis. What
is your answer to this interpretation?
Those who still believe that the euro has been somehow a factor in
protecting europe either have not understood anything that has happened in
recent years or are completely obsessed by the euro. The euro has been a
disaster for the european economy’s ability to cope with the shock of the great
crisis of 2007-2009. It has enhanced its effects, added other problems and
devastated every sector of the economy. The euro was a total failure in this regard.
I think it is more interesting to reflect on the fact that the euro has allowed
germany to become the dominant country in europe. This is the true meaning of
the euro. The single currency has allowed berlin to dominate the european
market and to become a global-exporting country able to penetrate the chinese
or us market. And to convert itself into the owner of financial assets. The
results that the euro has produced are exactly the opposite to what we were led
to expect.
Has
anything changed with brexit?
Brexit has in a sense been a response to the transformation of the eu
into an institution that protects and masks german power. A reaction caused by
the loss of sovereignty. It is important because it signals a response from
below to the new power that is emerging in europe. The will to separate from
this new empire. The difficulties the uk is experiencing in the last year show
how difficult this is. But i would not underestimate the strength of british
capitalism. In europe there are only three capitals that count: moscow, berlin
and london. And london is aware of it.
Do you
see analogies between brexit and trump’s victory?
Trump is a different thing. He is an answer that comes from the impasse
of neoliberalism. Trump seeks to exploit the feeling of losing popular
sovereignty and increasing social inequality through lies. I have not yet seen
a trump policy that respects his electoral promises. He seems to me like a
typical republican president who liberalizes the economy. A classic populist
demagogue.
Yannis
varoufakis argues that europe can still be democratized. You are firmly opposed
to this hypothesis. Why?
We have lost the last decade discussing how it was possible to change
the european union. Syriza thought naively that winning the elections and governing
greece could change the eu from within. Syriza has failed. And not because
greece is a small country. It would have been the same for any left-wing
government in spain or italy. Compared to a few years ago, however, we now know
why things have gone this way. It is due to the birth of a new centre-periphery
structure in europe with a centre that dominates and does not allow any
dissidence. Those who want to change things from the left must begin to fight
the european institutions and create new ones.
Can we
learn something from syriza’s experience?
We can learn what’s not to be done. There is nothing positive in this
experience. Syriza promised a lot, won the elections and went into government,
becoming a mass party. It was said that it was a new form of political
organization for the left. But in 2012, when it became the first party of the
opposition, and even more in 2015, when it went to the government, there was no
internal democracy. Syriza is a machine absorbed by the state that revolves
around a leader. He failed to create a new, truly democratic political
organization. But he also failed to try to change the economy and politics. It
lacked the ability to root itself into the territory. But if you really want to
change the world, this is a key issue. Syriza did not do it. And it gave up,
turning into a government party. Syriza shows us what should not be done and
how it should not be organized.
What is
greece’s situation two years since the signing of the third memorandum?
I think there’s been no government more submissive than that of tsipras
in the years of the crisis. They have surrendered completely. They have
accepted the target of a primary surplus of 3.5% of gdp for the next five
years. It’s incredible. Nobody talks about debt restructuring anymore. They
simply hope that liberalizations and privatizations will allow the economy to
rebound. With these policies, the greek economy may perhaps grow or contract a
bit, but it will actually stagnate. Unemployment will not be significantly
reduced and greece will become a poor and irrelevant country at the borders of
europe. Inequality will grow, young people will continue to emigrate, the
economy will rely on tourism. It’s a disaster.
There’s
been a lot of talk about the portuguese experience with antónio costa’s
socialist government supported by the leftists. What do you think?
If this is the best the left can do, then we do not need the left in
europe. The left is a political current that has always fought against the
powerful powers to build a new world. What is all this about in portugal? What
have they done? They went to the government. They may be able to limit the
application of austerity measures. But what do they think will happen? A
miracle? Portugal will not grow much. It will continue to be blocked. Like
greece. Do they not have any other ambitions? They will pay a price for this.
What does
the left need to do?
The key question is redefining sovereignty. What does popular
sovereignty mean today? But we also need to redefine national sovereignty.
Transnational bodies of the european union work against the interests of
workers and left-wing governments and maintain the existing hierarchy in
europe. These are crucial issues as they go to the heart of what socialism can
be. To this must be added an anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist economic
program: nationalizing the banks, enhancing public investment, strengthening
the welfare state … if you think that these goals can be achieved by changing
the eu, it means that nothing has been understood about what has happened in
the last ten years. It’s impossible. We must fight the mechanisms of the
european union and the power of germany. It’s not anti-european what i’m
saying. It is not nationalism. We must not confuse the international capitalism
that has been imposed in europe for the last thirty years with the
internationalism of the left and the workers.
Are you
therefore in favour of a future european federation?
Of course. The fact that there is no european nation is not a weakness.
We are what we are: italians, french, greeks … that’s what makes europe what it
is. What we need is not a european demos, but a genuine internationalism.
Having said that, it’s obvious that there are many things we can share. And
institutions can be built in this regard.
Are you
optimistic?
I take gramsci seriously. [laughs] i’m particularly optimistic when i
look at european youth. If i think about greece, i am conscious that young
people have travelled more and are more educated and informed of all the
previous generations. They’re better than we were. We will see what european
youth will do in the future. In this, i am confident.
Source: micromega
Translation: revolting europe
